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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
present case arises from a conviction

Driving Under the

.u.a,,~-·

of Alcohol, I.C.

§ 18-8004, against the Defendant, John Urresti. On December 31, 2014, Mr. Urresti was
subjected to a warrantless seizure by Corporal Paul Grabe of the Boise Police Department. (Tr.
p.13 IL 5-6; p 21 L 13). Mr. Urresti was driving his truck that night on Leadville Avenue. CCr. p.
13 11. 17-18; p. 16 11. 8-11 ). Also that night, officers were conducting an investigation on
Leadville, and several police cars were in the road. (Tr. p. 14 11. 14-21 ). As Mr. Urresti
approached the area where there were police cars, he slowed down; and without leaving his lane
of travel or committing any traffic violations, he began to drive between a police SUV, which did
not have its lights activated and was "across the street" from Mr. Urresti's lane of travel, and the
cars parked along the right side of the road. (Tr. p. 1511. 19-24; p. 2511. 1-25; p. 27 IL 23-24).
As Corporal Grabe saw Mr. Urresti beginning to drive into the area of the investigation,
Corporal Grabe "motioned for him to back up." (Tr. p. 19 IL 23-24). Mr. Urresti complied with
the command, and backed his car up. (Tr. 20 IL 5-6). After Mr. Urresti had complied with the
order to back up and was no longer moving toward Corporal Grabe' s investigation, Corporal
Grabe ordered Mr. Urresti to stop and roll down his window (Tr. p.2011. 11-16; p. 2111. 13-14).
Mr. Urresti complied, and ultimately the stop morphed into a DUI investigation.
Mr. Urristi was ultimately charged with DUI. Prior to trial in this matter, Mr. Urresti
filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence on the grounds that he was seized in violation ofldaho
Constitutional Article I section 17, and United States Constitutional Amendment IV. (R-13-14).
Hearing was held on March 16, 2015, in the Magistrate Division. (R-16-19). The presiding
Magistrate made oral findings on the record that day, finding that Mr. Urresti "was stopped by an
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defendant did
officer

orders

right-probably even the duty-to talk to

Corporal Grabe]," and
make sure that he

understood he can't do that." The Magistrate denied the Motion to Suppress Evidence, "viewing,
as I have to, the case in the light most favorable to the State." (Tr. p 6711. 12-16). On June 8,
2015, the Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal the Court's
decision on his Motion to Suppress Evidence. (R-35-38) He appealed to the District Court the
same day. (R-41-43).

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether the Magistrate Court erred in binding itself to viewing the evidence "in a light most
favorable to the State"
2. Whether the seizure of a driver who is obeying traffic laws and obeys the commands of an
officer directing traffic may be seized and subjected to questioning.

ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to detennine whether there
is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and
the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855,
858,,303 P.3d 217 (2013).
1. The Court should reverse the District Court's decision to affirm the Magistrate because
the Magistrate applied an incorrect legal standard in evaluating the evidence
The Magistrate erred in applying a legal standard in viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State. In the context of motions to suppress, "the power to assess the
credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
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l

Idaho 786, 789, 979

662 (Ct. App.

1

Here, the Magistrate Court stated that it "view( ed] as I have to, the case ... in the light
most favorable to the State." In announcing that standard, the Magistrate was effectively
announcing that it was bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and
giving up its power-and duty-to weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences. While it is
unclear what the Magistrate was referring to, it is clear from the statement of the standard that the
Magistrate felt he had facts to weigh. The Magistrate Court effectively did not recognize its
discretion in making its findings of fact. Consequently, the Magistrate abused its discretion and
the District Court erred in affirming the Magistrate's decision.
2. The Court should reverse the Magistrate's decision on Mr. Urresti's Motion to Suppress
Evidence because Mr. Urresti was subjected to a warrantless ar1d unreasonable seizure
Mr. Urresti was seized in violation of the US and Idaho Constitutions when he was
ordered to stop and roll down his window after obeying the officer's commands to address the
perceived risks of Mr. Urresti's otherwise lawful behavior. Both the United States Constitution
and the Idaho Constitution guarantee "the right of the people to be secure in their persons ...
against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend IV; Idaho Const. art I§ 17. A
seizure occurs when a police officer, through some show of authority restrains the liberty of a
person." State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647,649, 51 P.3d 461,463 (Ct. App. 2002). Furthermore,
when a person is seized without a warrant, the seizure is unlawful unless it is based on at least a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. State v. Willoughby, 147
Idaho 482,491,211 P.3d 91, 100 (2009). When a person unlawfully seized, all the fruits of the
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must

suppressed. Wong

V.

States,

1

1,

(

A seizure occurs whenever a person's liberty is restrained by a show of police authority.
Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486,211 P.3d at 95. Whether a person's liberty is restrained is an
objective test-if, considering the totality of the circumstances, police conduct would
communicate to a reasonable person that he is not allowed to ignore the police and go about his
business, then his liberty has been restrained, and he has been seized. State v. Henege, 143 Idaho
655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007). Furthermore, where a person is seized in a traffic stop, it
ordinarily "must last no longer than necessary to effectuate its purpose." State v. Johnson, 137
Idaho 656,659, 51 P.3d 1112, 1115 (2002). A person "may not be detained even momentarily
without objective grounds for doing so." State v. Gutierrez, 13 7 Idaho 647, 652, 51 P.3d 461,
466 (Ct. App. 2002).
When a person is seized without a warrant, the burden is on the State to show that the
seizure was reasonable. In the context of a Terry stop, the State must show that there was
reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Willoughby 147 Idaho at
490, 211 P .3d at 99. Reasonable suspicion exists when there is "some objective manifestation
that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." State v. Hankey, 134
Idaho 844, 847, 11 P.3d 40, 43 (2000).
In one case, State v. Henderson, the Supreme Court invalidated DUI checkpoints, holding
that Idaho Constitution requires "particularized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing" to justify a
stop. 114. Idaho 293,299, 756 P.2d 1057, 1065 (1986). In that case, the Boise Police
Department had established a roadblock in which drivers were systematically and without
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suspicion ordered to roll their windows

at 293-94,

1057-58.

Reasoning that a vn,.,.,.,u of Idaho has the right to have "police treat [him or herJ as a criminal
only if [his or her] actions correspond" the Court held that roadblocks run afoul ofldaho's
Constitution. Id. at 298, 756 P.2d at 1062.
Here, Mr. Urresti was unlawfully seized at the time he was ordered to stop and roll down
his window after having left the immediate area. The facts presented here are analogous to those
the Supreme Court was faced with in Henderson; though the roadblock in Henderson had a
different stated purpose from the roadblock here, the effect on drivers is identical if officers are
given the authority to seize every vehicle that approaches with or without any particularized
suspicion. It appears undisputed that Mr. Urresti was seized at the time Corporal Grabe ordered
Mr. Urresti to back up, and continued until Mr. Urresti was released from jail. Corporal Grabe
initially seized Mr. Urresti on the basis that he was about to hit a car (but didn't) and that he was
about to enter into an "investigation zone" (but didn't). While Corporal Grabe's stated purpose
of preserving of the investigation and ensuring officer safety justified keeping Mr. Urresti out of
the investigation zone-and there is substantial discussion by Corporal Grabe of the importance
of keeping vehicles out of the investigation area-any officer safety or evidence preservation
issues that may have justified redirecting Mr. Urresti away from the investigation zone dissipated
once Mr. Urresti had backed away from the scene. Allowing further contact following Mr.
Urresti's compliance with police orders to leave the scene is essentially allowing officers to
manufacture cause to conduct an investigatory stop.
Since there was no continuing justification for Mr. Urresti's detention, the continued
detention beyond having him leave the scene was unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional. Since
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all evidence obtained subsequent to stopping Mr. Urresti should have
suppressed, and

District Court erred in affirming

Magistrate's decision not to do so.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr Urresti respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District
Court's decision affirming the Magistrate's denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence and
remand this matter to the Magistrate for further proceedings.
DATED thisb a y of July 2016.
THE COX LAW FIRM, PLLC

By:

KYLE SCHOU,
Attorney for Defendant
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